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The Future of Social Security Pensions in Europe
Martin Feldstein
*
This paper discusses a possible solution to the problem that faces European governments
in dealing with the future of Social Security pensions.  The governments of the European Union
face a double problem.  Like other governments around the world, they must deal with the rising 
cost of pensions that will result from the increasing life expectancy of the population. But the
European governments have the extra problem that any solution must be compatible with a
European Union labor market in which individuals from any member country are free to work
anywhere within the European Union.  The solution to this double problem that is developed in
this paper combines an investment-based system of individual accounts with a ￿notional defined
contribution￿ system financed by pay-as-you-go taxes. 
Before discusing that option, I begin by providing a brief description of the current
pension situation in European countries and the prospects for the future if the current system is
left unchanged. I then discuss an obvious way of dealing with the double problem by shifting to a
pure investment based system of individual accounts.  Although this has attractive features, it is
likely to involve a politically  unacceptable degree of risk for future retirees. This leads to a
discussion of using a mixed system that combines investment-based and pay-as-you-go elements. 
Although using a defined-benefit form of the pay-as-you-go system for this purpose would create
problems in the context of the integrated European labor market, a notional defined contribution1For a description of the major Social Security pension systems of Europe and the history
of recent reforms, see Martin Feldstein and Horst Siebert, Social Security Pension Reform in
Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002) 
2 The Netherlands and Britain, with their funded systems, are largely immune to this
problem but not to the changes that will be needed. to operate in this labor market environment. 
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system of the type described below would avoid these problems and therefore would provide a
potential solution to the two problems facing European governments in dealing with their pension
systems.
Current and Future Social Security Pensions 
Although the current European Social Security pension systems differ from one another,
there are certain common features in most of the systems of  the European Union countries.
1  
They are financed by taxes (usually payroll taxes) on a pay-as-you-go basis, i.e., with the taxes
paid in each year used to finance concurrent benefits.  The benefits are generally based on the
number of years that the individual has worked and on the individual￿s average lifetime level of
earnings.
Because of the pay-as-you-go feature, the taxes needed to finance future benefits will rise
sharply as the number of retirees rises relative to the number of workers.  This is not a temporary
or transition problem but a permanent problem caused by the aging of the population.   With no
change in benefit rules or in the pay-as-you-go financing system, the tax rate required to finance
the benefits would have to rise by about 50 percent in most countries
2 with even greater increases
in some countries.   This high pension cost would be in addition to the cost of public sector health
services and to the other existing high income and value added tax rates. -3- SSPensEur.09052001.wpd
Even if the European governments were not facing this cost-increasing demographic
change, the current defined-benefit pay-as-you-go systems would not be a satisfactory long-term
structure for the EU countries as the EU labor market becomes more integrated.  To see why,
consider a Portugese citizen who works part of his life in Germany, part in France, and part in
Italy, and eventually retires in Spain.  He (or his employers in the three countries where he works)
pays taxes to the three different governments as part of their pay-as-you-go pension systems. 
When he retires in Spain, who will pay his benfits?  And under which country￿s defined benefit
rules will his benefits be calculated?
One possibility is that, as a Portugese citizen,  he will receive benefits from Portugal even
though he never worked there and never paid any taxes to Portugal.  That would obviously place
an unfair and unacceptable burden on Portugal. The same would be true of the possibility that the
benefits would be paid by Spain, the country where he retires.  A more plausible idea would be to
share the burden of retirement benefits among France, Germany, and Italy.  
But on what basis would the cost be divided?  What rules would determine his benefits? 
And what would make the separate contributions from the three governments add up to the
appropriate defined benefit total?  It would certainly not be appropriate to simply treat the three
employment experiences separately and allow the individual to collect the sum of the three, an
amount that might bear little or no resemblence to what he would receive with the same lifetime
earnings record if he had stayed in a single country. 
Investment Based Individual Accounts
A simple solution would be to replace the existing  pay-as-you-go defined-benefit plan3There would of course be a transition cost in the form of a higher saving rate in order to
make possible the lower long-term costs.  But calculations based on U.S. data suggest that such a
transition can be financed with a relatively small increase in total payments in the near term and
medium term, an increase that is substantially less than the permanent increase in the cost that
would be required if the current system were unchanged.  See, e.g., Martin Feldstein and Andrew
Samwick, ￿The Economics of Prefunding Social Security and Medicare,￿ in NBER
Macroeconomics Annual, 1997 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997) available also as NBER Working
Paper W6055 at www.nber.org/papers/w6055.
4The return in a pay-as-you-go system results from the increasing tax base used to finance
benefits.  Because the number of employees and the average real earnings of each empoyee rises
through time, a pay-as-you-go system can give retirees more in benefits than the taxes they paid
while they were working.
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with a system of individual investment-based accounts to which individuals and/or their
employers are required to contribute.  At retirement age, the accumulated balance in these
accounts could be used to finance an annuity.
Such an investment based account would be completely portable, going with the
individual as he goes from country to country.  The benefits could be paid wherever he retires. 
Governments or the EU might be involved in specifying the minimum amount (or percent of
earnings) that must be contributed and in regulating the form of investment and the rules
governing the payouts after normal retirement age.  But governments would not collect taxes or
pay benefits.
The higher rate of return available in such an investment-based system of individual
accounts would dramatically reduce the long-run cost of providing retirement benefits.
3 Under the
typical pay-as-you-go system, the individual earns a real rate of return on the contributions that he
and his employer make of about 2 percent per year.
4  In contrast, an investment based system5The six percent figures is based on U.S. data but is not likely to be very different for
investments in European securities.  More specifically, a portfolio of 60 percent stocks (the
Standard and Poors Index) and 40 percent corporate bonds had a mean real annual return of 6.7
percent for the period from 1945 to 1995.  If we subtract 0.4 percent for administrative costs, we
have a usable return of 6.3 percent.  (These values reflect the historic experience of a mean
logarithmic rate of return of 5.9 percent with a standard deviation of 12.5 percent; these
logarithmic rates of return imply a mean level rate of return of 6.7 percent.)
6Detailed calculations with annual saving and benefit payouts show that this is a quite
good approximation.
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would provide an expected real return of about 6 percent.
5 To see the impact of this difference in
rates of return on the cost of providing pension benefits, consider an individual who works from
age 25 to 65 and then  retires from age 65 until his death at age 85. The individual contributes to
the pension during his working years and receives benefits each year during retirement.  
The calculations can be simplified and made transparent if we assume that all of the
pension saving is done at the midpoint of the working years (i.e., at age 45) and that all of the
retirement benefits are paid at the midpoint of the retirement years (age 75).
6 With a 2 percent
pay-as-you-go saving  rate, $1000 contributed at age 45 grows to $1811 at age 75.  With a 6
percent rate of return, the same $1811can be achieved at age 75 by saving only $315 at age 45. 
Thus the investment based system can produce the same retirement benefit with less than one-
third of the contribution of the pay-as-you-go system.  This in turn implies that benefits that would
require a 30 percent payroll tax rate could be financed with an investment based saving  rate of
9.45 percent.  Such a reduction in the mandatory contribution rate during working years would
substantially raise the spendable income of the typical employee and would also substantiually
reduce the distortions to incentives caused by the low-return pay-as-you-go tax.7Martin Feldstein and Elena Ranguelova, ￿Individual Risk in an Investment Based Social
Security System,￿ American Economic Review, September 2001, available also as NBER
Working Paper number 8074 (see www.nber.org/papers/w8074.)
8The simulations reflect the uncertainty about the mean return in the future as well as the
year to year fluctuations around that mean.  
9The benefit rules specified in current law relate benefits to past earnings.    Benefits
replace approximately 40 percent of immediate preretirement wages for a retiree with average
lifetime earnings and without dependents and about 60 percent of earnings for such a retiree with
a dependent spouse.  The benefits are adjusted each year after retirement to maintain a constant
real value. Maintaining the current benefit rules  would require raising the payroll tax rate from
the current 12.4 percent to about 19 percent as the ratio of retirees to workers increases. 
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Market Risks in Investment-Based Systems
These rate of return calculations are based on the average return that has been achieved
historically and that might be expected to prevail on average in the future. There is, however,
significant uncertainty about the future rates of return and substantial variability from year to year
in the return on a portfolio of stocks and bonds.  To assess the extent of the risks that an
individual would face in such an investment-based system, Elena Ranguelova and I
7 calculated the
probability distribution of the pension annuties that an individual would receive if he (or his
employer) saved 6 percent of his earnings in each year, invested those savings in a portfolio of 60
percent stocks and 40 percent bonds,  and then used the accumulated proceeds at age 66 to
purchase a variable annuity invested in the same stock-bond mix.
8   We compared the resulting
annuity payments to the benefits that would be payable under current U.S. benefit rules, which we
refer to as the  ￿benchmark￿ level of benefits.
9
The simulation results for retirees at age 67, 77, and 87 are shown in Table 1.  The median
investment-based annuity at age 67 would be equal to more than twice the benchmark benefit (i.e.,
2.12 times the benchmark) even though the six percent saving rate is only about one-third of the-7- SSPensEur.09052001.wpd
long-run tax rate that would be required with a pure pay-as-you-go system.   There is only one
chance in about 5 that the 67 year old retiree would receive less in the investment-based system
than in the pay-as-you-go system and an equal probability of receiving at least 4.3 times the
benchmark benefit.
There is, however, a small chance that the retiree would receive substantially less in the
investment based system than the benchmark level of benefits.  Table 1 shows that a 67 year old
has one chance in 50 of receiving only 47 percent of the benchmark benefit and one chance in 100
of receiving less than 40 percent of the benchmark benefit.
The risk of a relatively low benefit increases as the individual ages, reflecting the
increasing variance as more years of uncertain returns are accumulated. At age 77, there is one
chance in 10 that the investment based retirement benefit would be less than 56 percent of the
benchmark benefit and one chance in 100 that it would be less than 21 percent of the benchmark. 
At age 87, there is one chance in 10 that it would be less than 40 percent of the benchmark and
one chance in 100 that it would be less than 12 percent of the benchmark.
Some individuals might be willing to accept the risk implied by these figures in order to
have the higher expected level of benefits than in the pay-as-you-go system as well as the
possibility of the substantially higher benefits associated with the cumulative probabilities of 70,
80 and 90 percent.  This would be particularly true among those who have private pensions and
other sources of retirement income.  Others who do not have additional sources of retirement
income might still favor  the investment-based system but would invest in a more conservative
portfolio that provided less opportunity for both low and high annuity values. But for many
individuals, this pure investment based system might entail too much risk for it to be a politically10See Martin Feldstein and Elena Ranguelova, ￿Individual Risk and Intergenerational
Risk Sharing in an Investment-Based Social Security System,￿ National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper 6839, 1998, available at www.nber.org/papers/w6839.
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viable alternative to the pay-as-you-go system.  
Guarantees to Reduce Risk
Several Latin American governments, including Chile, Argentina, and Mexico,  have
introduced pure investment based systems but have combined that with a government guarantee
that the each retiree will receive at least as much as he would have under the rules of the previous
pay-as-you-go system.  This does of course put future taxpayers at risk of having to pay retirees to
fill the shortfall between their investment-based annuities and the guarantee level.  However , the
figures in Table 1 imply that the probability that taxpayers will be called upon in this way is quite
low, e.g., less than a 20 percent probability that retirees aged 67 would need a supplementary
payout and about a 33 percent probability for those aged 87.  Calculations indicate that there is
about a 60 percent probability that taxpayers will not have to make any payment in a year.
10 The
sum of the expected guarantee payments and the 6 percent saving rate is almost always less than
the tax that would be required to support the same level of retirement benefits in a pure pay-as-
you-go system.
It is not necessary to have government guarantees to reduce the risk of the pure
investment-based system.  Private financial markets could in principle provide a guarantee for
those individuals who want one and are willing to pay for it by accepting a lower expected rate of
return.  One possibility is to give up some of the potential for the very high annuity levels shown
in Table 1 in order to eliminate the risk of very low annuities. Financial markets could deliver this11For an example of such a mixed system, see Martin Feldstein and Andrew Samwick,
￿Potential Effects of Two Percent Personal Retirement Accounts,￿ Tax Notes, vol.79, No. 5, May
4, 1998, available in an updated version in National Bureau of Economic Research Working
Paper 6540 (see www.nber.org/papers/w6540). 
12To see this, note that if the pay-as-you-go benefits are half of the benchmark, the
individual receives 80 percent of the benchmark if the investment-based component is equal to
30 percent of the benchmark.  For a 77 year old, Table 1 shows that with a 6 percent saving rate
the investment-based component has only a 5 percent chance of being less than 62 percent of the
benchmark.  With half of that saving rate, the investment-based component has a 5 percent
chance of being less than 31 percent of the benchmark.  Combining the two implies that there
would be only  a five percent chance of being less than 81 percent of the benchmark.  
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by selling a ￿collar,￿ i.e., a ￿put option￿ that reduces the risk of low annuities financed by
foregoing some or all of the annuity payments above some level.  The individual in effect sells a
￿call option￿ on his annuity in order to finance the purchase of a put option. 
An alternative way to reduce the risk of the pension system to both retirees and taxpayers
is to use a mixed system that combines an investment based component with some pay-as-you-go
benefit.
11  This raises the expected cost of providing the benefits but reduces the risk of very low
benefits or of a very large tax financed guarantee payment.  For example, cutting the full future
pay-as-you-go tax in half (i.e., from 19 percent to 9.5 percent in the US context) would finance
half of the benchmark benefit, guaranteeing that no matter how poorly financial markets perform
the retiree would have at least 50 percent of the benchmark benefit level.  Combining this with a
three percent rate of saving and portfolio investment (instead of the six percent assumed in Table
1) would cut the probability that a 67 year old would receive less than 80 percent of the
benchmark from 10 percent to less than 5 percent.
12  The probability of receiving less than 50
percent of the benchmark would be cut from about 2 percent to zero.
Such a mixed system thus eliminates the risk of very low levels of retirement income but13For a description of these systems, see the papers on Sweden and Italy in Martin
Feldstein and Horst Siebert, Social Security Pension Reform in Europe. (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, forthcoming 2002), available at www.nber.org   under Books-in-Progress.
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does so only by accepting a higher combined cost of the two components.  Alternatively, one can
think of a mixed system as reducing the cost of a pure pay-as-you-go system by accepting some
investment risk.
A Notional Defined Contribution System
But even if European governments were willing to accept the combination of cost and risk
involved in the mixed system, it would not be possible to use a defined benefit form of the pay-as-
you-go system because of the problems that I discussed earlier in this paper, i.e., setting the
benefit level and allocating the cost for individuals who work in more than one country.  There is
however an attractive alternative for the pay-as-you-go component: a ￿notional￿ defined
contribution system of the type that has recently been introduced on a purely national basis in
Sweden and Italy.
13  In a notional defined contribution system, each individual has a personal
account to which he (or his employer) pays a prescribed annual amount or share of earnings. 
These funds are not invested in stocks and bonds but go to the government and are used to finance
concurrent pay-as-you-go benefits. But unlike the defined benefit system, each individual￿s
account is directly credited with the amount that the individual (or his employer) pays into the
pay-as-you-go system.  In addition, the account receives a rate of return on the accumulated
balance at a notional rate of ￿interest￿ equal to the rate of growth of the aggregate payroll tax base. 
This notional rate of return is the rate that the government can afford to pay in a pure pay-as-you-
go system and makes the expected benefits equal on average to the benefits that would be paid in-11- SSPensEur.09052001.wpd
a defined benefit pay-as-you-go system.
The advantage of the notional defined contribution system is that it makes it easy to
operate a pay-as-you-go system in which the individual works in a variety of countries during his
lifetime and may retire in yet a different one.  With a notional defined contribution system, there
is no difficulty in defining the available benefits.  At retirement age, the individual has an
accumulated amount in his personal account that he can take in cash, convert to a private
investment-based annuity, or shift to a pay-as-you-go annuity with a rate of return equal to the rate
of growth of the tax base in the country to which he transfers those funds.   
The amount of the accumulated funds at retirement age (or indeed at any age before that)
in the individual￿s account is the sum of what he and his employer paid in taxes during his
working years augmented by the notional rate of return.  If the individual starts by working in
Germany, he or his German employer pays a payroll tax to the German government which credits
the account with a rate of return equal to the estimated long-term rate of growth of the payroll tax
base in Germany (i.e., the sum of the growth rates of average wages and the number of people in
the labor force). If at the end of (say) 15 years the individual moves his employment to France, the
German government transfers the individual￿s accumulated funds to the French government. 
Additional tax payments and notional interest then accumulate in the individual￿s account, using
the French tax rate and the French notional rate of return.      
When the individual retires, all of the funds in his account is owed to him by the
government where he was working when he retired.  There is no unfair burden on any country
since each country transfers to a successor government or to the individual only the amount that
that individual has paid into the local system (including the amount carried over from a previous14See descriptions of several European systems that have made such a transition in Martin
Feldstein and Horst Siebert, Social Security Pension Reform in Europe (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2002) and of the Australian experience in Malcolm Edey and John Simon,
￿Australia￿s Retirement Income System,￿  in Martin Feldstein, Privatizing Social Security
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
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government ) plus a rate of return that can be attributed on the basis of the growing tax revenue
without having to raise the tax rate. 
There would of course be both administrative and economic problems in shifting from the
existing national pay-as-you-go systems to a mixed system that combines individual investment
based defined contribution accounts with individual pay-as-you-go notional defined contribution
accounts.  But the examples of Sweden and Italy show how the shift from traditional defined
benefits to notional defined contributions can be introduced and several countries have shown
how to shift from a pure pay-as-you-go system to one that combines that system with individual
investment based accounts. 
14  Unless the countries of the European Union move in this direction,
they will face substantially higher payroll tax rates and a Social Security pension system that is not




Probability Distribution of Investment-Based Retiree Benefits
as Multiple of the Pay-as-You-Go Benchmark Benefits
Cumulative
Probability
Age 67 Age 77 Age 87
0.01 0.40 0.21 0.12
0.02 0.47 0.26 0.17
0.05 0.61 0.39 0.26
0.10 0.79 0.56 0.40
0.20 1.08 0.84 0.65
0.30 1.38 1.16 0.95
0.40 1.71 1.52 1.34
0.50 2.12 1.95 1.83
0.60 2.57 2.54 2.49
0.70 3.26 3.34 3.45
0.80 4.29 4.72 5.04
0.90 6.30 7.49 8.84
The investment-based benefits are based on a saving rate of 6 percent and a real mean return of
6.3 percent.  The benchmark benefits are the benefits that would be paid to an average employee
under the current pay-as-you-go U.S. Social Security law; in the long-term this would require
taxes equal to 19 percent of earnings.  
Source: Martin Feldstein and Elena Ranguelova, ￿Individual Risk in an Investment-Based Social
Security System,￿ American Economic Review , 2001 and NBER Working Paper 8074.